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1.  The question 
 
In a recent monograph1 and in a subsequent edited volume,2 Anthea 
Roberts makes the case for the adoption of a comparative international 
law (CIL)3 approach in the study and practice of international law.4 CIL 
is a project addressed primarily to international lawyers rather than 
States.5 It offers a vision of what international lawyers should be doing in 
 
 * Adjunct Professor of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law at 
the School of Law of the University of Milano-Bicocca. The research for this paper was 
undertaken primarily at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and 
International Law (Heidelberg). I would like to extend my gratitude to Anne Peters and 
my co-fellows at the Max Planck Institute for comments and discussions on various 
aspects of this paper. For their useful feedback, I would also like to thank the Chair (H.E. 
Judge Kenneth Keith) and the other attendees of the Session ‘Public International Law’ 
of the 26th Annual Conference of the Australian and New Zealand Society of 
International Law, at which an earlier version of this paper has been presented. 
1 A Roberts, Is International Law International? (OUP 2017) 2. 
2 A Roberts, P Stephan, P-H Verdier, M Versteeg (eds), Comparative International 
Law (OUP 2018) 4 (hereinafter Comparative International Law).  
3 In recent years, the proposal for comparative international law was made by by Martti 
Koskenniemi. See M Koskenniemi, ‘The Case for Comparative International Law’ (2009) 
20 Finnish YB Intl L 1. For earlier attempts, see WE Butler, ‘Comparative Approaches 
to International Law’ (1985) 190 Recueil des Cours de l’Académe de Droit International 
9-85; E McWhinney, ‘Comparative International Law: Regional or Sectorial InterSys-
temic Approaches to Contemporary International Law’ in R-J Dupuy (ed), The Future of 
International Law in a Multicultural World (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984).   
4 For an outline of the CIL project see A Roberts, P Stephan, P-H Verdier, M 
Versteeg, ‘Comparative International Law: Framing the Field’ (2015) 109 AJIL 467-74.  
5 See in this regard H Ruiz Fabri, ‘From Babel to Esperanto and Back Again: The 
Fate of International Law (or of International Lawyers?)’ in the Symposium co-organized 
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the 21st century in response to the challenges of a fast-changing, multi-
polar world. Considering the topic’s great interest and timeliness, this 
paper purports to reflect on this project in some detail.  
The plea for the adoption of a CIL approach originates from findings 
made in Roberts’ monographic study. This study examines how interna-
tional law scholars think of, teach, and use international law in several 
selected countries (the five countries that are permanent members of the 
UN Security Council). A key result of the study is that international law 
is not as international, let alone universal, as claimed and that, therefore, 
a discipline that likes to think of itself as cosmopolitan turns out to be 
rather parochial.6 Roberts says that there is not (or no longer is) an ‘invis-
ible college of international lawyers’, but that there is only a divided col-
lege composed of ‘different national communities of international law-
yers’ who construct ‘their understandings of international law in ways 
that belie the field’s claim to universality’.7 Hence, far from there being 
one international law that is clear and equal for all, there is a ‘transna-
tional legal field’8 made of ‘multiple partially overlapping fields’9 or, in 
other words, a pluralistic legal order riddled with different views (some 
may qualify it as ‘fragmented’), interpretations, and applications. Accord-
ing to Roberts, neither of these different perceptions should be snubbed, 
but instead they should be understood, and factored into the teaching 
and practice of international law. CIL is the methodological approach 
that Roberts proposes to international lawyers to make the best out of 
those differences. CIL purports to examine ‘cross-national similarities 
and differences in the way that international law is understood, inter-
preted, applied, and approached by actors in and from different states’.10 
CIL is not a normative mandated process in the sense of being required 
by existing international law norms. Its justification lies in the urgency of 
the problems to be tackled and in the significance of the aspirations it is 
meant to serve.  
 
by EJIL: Talk! and Opinio Juris, D Akande, ‘Joint Symposium with Opinio Juris on 
Anthea Roberts’ Is International Law International?’ (7 February 2018) (hereiafter EJIL 
Talk Joint Symposium) <www.ejiltalk.org/category/ejil-book-discussion/>. 
6 Roberts, Is International Law International? (n 1) 312-25. 
7 ibid. 
8 ibid 25. 
9  ibid. 
10 ibid 2.  
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 At first blush, the introduction of a new methodology within the field 
of public international law may be looked at as an eccentricity in a disci-
pline that is mature and technical enough not to be in need of new heu-
ristic tools. Yet, upon closer inspection, one notices that CIL is much 
more than a legal technique. As I understand it, CIL is a functional device 
serving a political project directed at the betterment of international law 
as a profession and, in turn, of international law as a normative system. 
For Roberts, in a multipolar new world order, ‘international lawyers 
should rely on a comparative international law approach to become more 
humble, open, and reflexive in their engagement with international law’11 
by looking ‘at their field through different eyes’ and ‘from different per-
spectives’.12 A CIL approach may also draw attention to the ‘existence of 
certain forms of dominance’, so that international lawyers can see ‘whose 
norms are being globalised’ and how ‘globalised localisms often skew to-
wards Western approaches in general and Anglo-American approaches 
in particular’.13  
In other words, CIL is the therapy that Roberts offers to remedy the 
flaws and biases of international lawyers – particularly of Western inter-
national lawyers. It is meant to push international lawyers to go beyond 
their own convictions and beneath the surface of international law ‘in-
stead of just accepting their own self-reinforcing vision of the truth’.14 It 
is considered appropriate as international lawyers are called upon to op-
erate in a rapidly-changing world that is no longer Western-centric, and 
the dialogue between and among new (and hegemonic) actors becomes 
paramount. In such a scenario, there is a need for a more inclusive way 
of communication and cooperation among scholars, in spite of their dif-
ferent backgrounds and beliefs. This communication must start, argues 
Roberts, by taking seriously the views of the ‘unlike minded’ scholars.15 
By doing all of this, CIL would be the primary instrument for prompting 
the renewal of international law while ensuring its continued relevance, 
despite significant power shifts among nations.16 
 
11 ibid 325. 
12 ibid 2. 
13 ibid 10.  
14 ibid 325. 
15 ibid 13-7. 
16 ibid. 
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Should international lawyers embrace the CIL project? One can read-
ily share Roberts’ laudable aspiration to renew international law and to 
deal more effectively with the challenges of our times. She is spot-on in 
her quest for going beyond one’s comfort zone and engaging in a more 
constructive and effective communication among international lawyers 
of different origins and backgrounds. Still, the complexity and the 
breadth of the CIL project as both a legal and a political tool commands 
a more nuanced response.  
To this end, this paper is divided in three parts. First, it illustrates the 
theoretical and factual basis underlying the CIL project. Second, it pro-
vides an overview of the function(s) that comparative law currently plays 
in different branches of public international law and asks in what way a 
more robust turn to comparative law than is currently in place may enrich 
international law. Third, it reflects on the relationship between the CIL 
approach and the existing system of international law as a set of primary 
and secondary rules.  
 
 
2. Theoretical and factual underpinnings   
 
Under a traditional positivist approach, international law is a norma-
tive system with, at its core, rules and principles created and developed 
primarily through the practice of States.17 From this perspective, interna-
tional law exists and develops not without, but quite independently from, 
its scholars, although the role of scholars in defining the content of norms 
is far from negligible in a system based, at least in part, on uncodified and 
unwritten norms. 18 Although this account of international law probably 
still prevails, the theoretical underpinnings of Roberts’ work appear to be 
at a distance from the terrain of positivism. This point requires some ex-
planation. 
Over the years, different ways of thinking about international law 
have emerged within the field of public international law or have been 
 
17 See generally M Shaw, International Law (CUP 2018) 32-39 and J Crawford, 
Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th edn, OUP 2012) 20-47. 
18 A Pellet, ‘Article 38’ in A Zimmermann, K Oellers-Frahm, C Tomuschat (eds), 
The Statute of the International Court of Justice. A Commentary (2nd edn, OUP 2012) 
677, 859.  
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imported from domestic legal systems.19 Chief among them is critical le-
gal studies (CLS). Jan Klabbers speaks of the ‘critical revolution in inter-
national law’ prompted in the early 1980s by the works of David Kennedy 
and Martti Koskenniemi.20 CLS is a legal philosophy that exposes a rad-
ical scepticism towards the tenets of both positive and natural law, and 
insists on the structural close connection between international law and 
politics.21 As such, CLS warns that international law is not necessarily a 
force for good, but that it can be (or has been) the instrument of some-
one’s own hegemonic agenda and thus it can be itself ‘part of the prob-
lem’.22 In an intrinsically political international law, the moral and politi-
cal preferences of the interpreter, who often remains undisclosed, are not 
subordinate to the available normative data, but intentionally or uninten-
tionally shape the meaning of those data. Martti Koskenniemi – who 
writes the preface of Roberts’ monographic study – famously said that 
‘international law is what international lawyers do and how they think’.23 
Following this lead, some international lawyers have undertaken a critical 
evaluation of what international lawyers do. They study ‘the way in which 
our mode of thinking, including our beliefs and values, affects our re-
search and work’.24 This is perceived as necessary because ‘unmasking or 
unveiling […] theoretical assumptions and presumptions helps us better 
comprehend the nature of our understanding of international law, and 
the biases that may accompany our own or others’ visions of it’.25 Roberts 
herself ‘encourages international lawyers to be more reflective about the 
particularities of their networks and perspectives and more reflective 
about how they engage with the field’.26 
 
19 A Bianchi, International Law Theories. An Inquiry into Different Ways of Thinking 
(OUP 2016) 3. 
20 J Klabbers, International Law (CUP 2018) 13-16.  
21 See generally Bianchi, International Law Theories (n 19) 135-39. 
22 M Koskenniemi, ‘Between Commitment and Cynicism: Outline for a Theory of 
International Law as Practice’ in J d’Aspremont , T Gazzini, A Nollkaemper, W Werner 
(eds),  International Law as a Profession (CUP 2017) 31-66, 65 (International Law as a 
Profession). 
23 M Koskenniemi, ‘Foreword’ in Anthea Roberts, Is International Law 
International? (OUP 2017). 
24 Bianchi, International Law Theories (n 19) 3. 
25 ibid 1. 
26 Roberts, Is International Law International? (n 1) 36-8. 
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Building on this way of thinking about international law, the CIL pro-
ject examines international law as a profession rather than as the practice 
of States. In this sense, the CIL approach may therefore be seen more as 
an offshoot of CLS-style thinking rather than positivist sensibilities.  
 That said, as a general framework, the CIL project constitutes a fresh 
innovation from the critical legal studies template of combining a radical 
criticism27 with an under purposive attitude that leaves one with more 
scepticism than tools to tackle contemporary legal problems. To her 
credit, Roberts articulates a potential solution as to the problems she 
identifies. This makes possible engagement with her project in the pur-
suit of what ultimately are shared aspirations and values, notwithstanding 
one’s difference of perspectives.  
The theoretical basis underpinning Roberts’ work has an impact on 
the findings of Is International Law International?. Focusing on discuss-
ing what lawyers do as opposed to inquiring what States do, although 
fully justified from the philosophical and legal perspective she embraces, 
does present issues in terms of the persuasiveness of the analysis on which 
the CIL project is based. It leaves behind insights about the internation-
ality of international law that could have been gained from looking at the 
practice of States. The possibility that international law could be interna-
tional and universal certainly exists, regardless of international lawyers’ 
views. One criterion for so determining could have been the degree of 
ratification by States of treaties. For example, there are areas of interna-
tional law such as international humanitarian law that have reached a 
considerable degree of universality (which is not the same, of course, as 
compliance) as confirmed by the fact that the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
have received  universal ratification.28  A CIL approach could supplement 
this analysis by providing insights on how effective these norms are 
within a domestic order, but the starting point to gauge their relevance 
as a universal instrument should be the practice of States. 
Next, the fact that the analysis is limited to the state of international 
law in the five countries that are permanent members of the UN Security 
 
27 In reflecting on the Critical Legal Studies school of international law, Georges Abi-
Saab writes that ‘it is the summum of cynism to criticise the existing rules vehemently, 
while refusing to propose any alternatives, as do the members of this school’.  G Abi-
Saab, ‘The Third World Intellectual in Praxis: Confrontation, Participation, or Operation 
Behind Enemy Lines’ (2016) 37 Third World Quarterly 1957, 1958. 
28 T Meron, ‘The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law’ (1987) 81 AJIL 348.  
Uses and possible misuses of a Comparative International Law approach                         27 
 
Council cautions against the possibility of considering those findings of 
general validity. One wonders, for instance, what the regard for interna-
tional law is in countries that need international law the most; have used 
it to defend and pursue their sovereign interest against hegemonic States 
(some of which are represented in the Security Council); or have a strong 
tradition of doctrinal commitment to the study and development of in-
ternational law. These countries include, for instance, various African 
States, which over the years have relied on key international law princi-
ples such as the right to self-determination, sovereignty over natural re-
sources, and uti possidetis.29 
That said, the scientific interest in Roberts’ work and, as a conse-
quence, in the CIL project, remains. This is because how international 
law is perceived in those countries that exercise a key responsibility 
within the international community is a matter that concerns us all. What 
also concerns all of us is what to do about renewing our discipline for the 
21st century.   
 
 
3. Comparative International Law as a legal methodology 
 
As comparative law scholars explain, comparative law is a discipline 
that is used to analyse and confront normative solutions in two or more 
different legal systems.30 At a macro level, what is compared are the main 
traits of different legal systems (ie common/civil law); the procedures for 
resolving and deciding disputes; or the role of those engaged in law, such 
as courts.31 At a micro level, comparative law has to do with specific legal 
institutions or problems. Rules are compared to address actual problems 
or particular conflicts of interest across different normative systems.32 
Unlike other legal disciplines, comparative law does not consist of posi-
tive legal rules.33 Rather, it is a perspective on existing law that can be 
used in any field of domestic laws. Comparative law does not comprise 
rules, but is a method of studying law. It is also a stock of academic 
 
29 Roberts, Is International Law International? (n 1) 36-9. 
30 K Zweigert, H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (OUP 2011) 4. 
31 ibid 4-5. 
32 Zweigert, Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (n 30) 4-5. 
33 M Reimann, ‘Comparative Law and Neighbouring Disciplines’ in The Cambridge 
Companion to Comparative Law (CUP 2012) 13, 14. 
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knowledge having law as its object and comparison as its process.34 It is 
an effort to be ‘cosmopolitan’ for lawyers trained in domestic jurisdic-
tions, so that they learn from approaches in different jurisdictions and 
can be ‘international’.35 While comparative law is used very much in the 
field of private international law to examine, inter alia, which normative 
solutions should prevail in a given context, comparative lawyers normally 
do not study classic public international law. This is mainly because the 
law of nations is perceived as a fairly uniform (international) system that 
provides little to no opportunity to compare anything (unlike the differ-
ent domestic versions of private international law).36  
That said, two comparativists, Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, sug-
gest that the method of comparative law could also be successfully em-
ployed in the field of public international law when interpreting the 
meaning of treaties, and in helping to understand some of the concepts 
and institutions of customary international law. For instance, the rule 
pacta sunt servanda, the clause rebus sic stantibus, and the theory of abuse 
de droit in international law all have their roots in the institution of mu-
nicipal private law.37 Hence, a comparison may occur between the inter-
national system and domestic legal systems to enrich the former. In line 
with these two authors’ suggestions, it can be observed that there are a 
number of uses for comparative law within the field of public interna-
tional law that have been employed, to a greater or lesser extent, at the 
international and domestic levels. The principle examples can be recalled 
here. 
First, as Bing Jia observes, there is space for ‘a comparative approach’ 
within the classical sources of international law. Under Article 38(1)(c) 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, comparative law can 
be used to identify ‘the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations’.38 However, a survey of the application of this provision since the 
 
34 ibid 14. 
35 Zweigert, Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (n 30) 15-6. 
36 HC Gutteridge, Comparative Law (CUP 1946) at 51-61, Zweigert, Kotz, An 
Introduction to Comparative Law (n 30) at 8; and Reimann, Comparative Law and 
Neighbouring Disciplines (n 33) at 18. 
37 Zweigert, Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (n 31) 6. 
38 BB Jia, ‘A Word on the Comparative Approach of International Law and a Pro-
posed Direction for Chinese Textbooks of International Law’ in EJIL Talk Joint Sympo-
sium (n 5). 
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Permanent Court of International Justice, conducted by Alain Pellet, 
suggests that this norm has found, for a number of reasons,  limited ap-
plication in the practice of the International Court of Justice.39  
Second, as Mathias Fourteau explains, comparative law is frequently 
relied upon in the work of the International Law Commission. It is used 
to identify possible differences among State practices or opinio juris and 
to identify the minimum common denominator among States on the con-
tent of existing international law.40 In this sense, comparative law is a 
‘conduit between international law and domestic laws’.41 Third, as Neha 
Jain has shown, comparative law has been used at the International Crim-
inal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to determine the exist-
ence of general principles of law.42 In this regard, the writer can add his 
own personal experience as an ICTY legal officer to recall that a compar-
ative approach was also used, at times, in the process of drafting and 
amending the rules of procedure and evidence. It was a constant feature 
to compare norms belonging to different legal traditions and jurisdictions 
to determine the content of a rule to be included or amended in the rules 
of procedure and evidence.   
Fourth, comparative law may be used to compare norms and cases 
that concern the same issues, but are defined and applied differently in 
different regimes and treaties of international law. It would also be the 
opportunity to reflect on how ‘international law is made’ and assess that 
significant variance can exist among States ‘at states of law-making and 
law-formation.43 In the case of treaties, the comparison would serve the 
purpose of clarifying the content of a given norm by examining the pro-
cess through which the meaning of a norm (or of a reservation44) came 
 
39 A Pellet, ‘Article 38’ (n 18) 766-772. 
40 M Forteau, ‘Comparative International Law Within Not Against, International 
Law: Lessons from the International Law Commission’ in Comparative International Law 
(n 2) 161.    
41 ibid 179. 
42 N Jain, ‘Comparative International Law at the ICTY: The General Principles 
Experiment’ (2015) 109 AJIL 486. 
43 See T Broude, YZ Haftel, A Thompson, 'Who Cares About Regulatory Space in 
BITs? A Comparative International Approach’ in Comparative International Law (n 2) 
527, 545.  
44 As perceptively remarked in T Ginsburg, ‘Objections to Treaty Reservations: A 
Comparative Approach to Decentralized Interpretation’ in Comparative International 
Law (n 2) 230-1. 
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into being or is being interpreted by States.45 Different judicial bodies 
may treat norms of human rights and humanitarian law differently. In 
this regard, Mathias Siems sees a role for comparative law in connection 
with the process of the fragmentation of international law in different 
legal regimes. The more that international law specialises and evolves in 
a system of regional actors and institutions (each operating within an ad 
hoc specific normative framework, albeit within the framework of general 
international law), the more there is room for comparing different legal 
approaches and processes.46 
Fifth, comparative law can be used to determine the content of a 
norm of international law by examining the way it is interpreted by do-
mestic actors.47  One way of so doing is to ‘identify and interpret interna-
tional law by comparing various domestic court decisions’.48 Moreover, 
as Anne Peters recalls, a comparative approach can be used to compare 
the international law system with domestic systems to verify the content 
of a norm of international law.49 In this way, a comparative approach 
would be beneficial, Peters notes, in that by ‘analysing national practice’ 
 
45 See as examples in this regard the studies of S Dothan, ‘Comparative Views on the 
Right to Vote in International Law: The Case of Prisoners' Disenfranchisement’ in 
Comparative International Law (n 2) 379;  J Goldenziel, ‘When Law Migrates: Refugees 
in Comparative International Law’ in Comparative International Law (n 2) 397; and A 
Knight, ‘An Asymmetric Comparative International Law Approach to Treaty 
Interpretation: The CEDAW Committee’s Tolerance of the Scandinavian States’ 
Progressive Deviation’, in Comparative International Law (n 2) 419. 
46 M Siems, Comparative International Law (CUP 2018) 293-301. See further, C 
McCrudden, ‘Comparative International Law and Human Rights’ in Comparative 
International Law (n 2) 444-46. 
47 P-H Verdier, M Versteeg, ‘International Law in National Legal Systems: An Em-
pirical Investigation’ in Comparative International Law (n 2) 209-230; KL Cope, H Mo-
vassagh, ‘National Legislatures: The Foundations of Comparative International Law’ in 
Comparative International Law (n 2) 271. 
48 A Roberts, ‘Comparative International Law? The Role of National Courts in 
Creating and Enforcing International Law’ (2011) 60 ICLQ 57; C Cai, ‘International Law 
in Chinese Courts during the Rise of China’ in Comparative International Law (n 2) at 
295, 317-318 and L Mälksoo, ‘Case Law in Russian Approaches to International Law’ in 
Comparative International Law (n 2) at 337. Interestingly, Mälksoo also suggests that 
‘academic projects in comparative international law should take history into account as 
much as possible as an explanatory factor’ (ibid 338). 
49 A Peters, ‘International Legal Scholarship Under Challenge’ in International Law 
as a Profession (n 26) 124. 
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it would be possible to ‘identify a truly international legal corpus of rules 
on a particular international problem at hand’.50  
Finally, comparative law is used frequently at the European Court of 
Human Rights. This court employs comparison among States Parties’ 
laws to ascertain the meaning and scope of treaty provisions. The process 
of comparison is used to legitimise the Court’s exercise of discretion. If 
there is a sufficient degree of commonality in some of the States Parties’ 
laws, the Court may accept the evolution of the European Convention of 
Human Rights’ norms in a new situation. Comparison shows the linkage 
between the international and the national by highlighting that what is 
done at the Court is derived from domestic jurisdictions and gains legit-
imacy from domestic jurisdictions.51  
In light of this review, it could be argued that there is conspicuous 
room within public international law for the use of comparative law ap-
proaches. Therefore, insofar as the CIL approach is a call to international 
lawyers to foster different uses of the comparative law methodology and 
to make them part of the daily routine of international law scholarship, 
the  international lawyers must respond to this call affirmatively. These 
uses of comparative law are not a novelty to the field of international law. 
After all, it is part and parcel of the traditional function of international 
lawyers to examine the content of international law in different contexts 
to ascertain and determine the existence, content, and effectiveness of a 
given norm.52 The value of insisting on a CIL approach is that it could be 
a sort of umbrella under which different techniques and approaches em-
ployed could be placed and systematised. It could be the opportunity to 
expand knowledge of different normative approaches (and in this way to 
teach lawyers to see things differently), and a reminder that the determi-
nation of the content and existence of a norm of international law should 
be arrived at after reviewing the practice of all the concerned legal sys-
tems and jurisdictions rather than only a selected few often drawn from 
 
50 ibid.  
51 P Carrozza, ‘Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law in International Human 
Rights: Some Reflections on the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(1998) 73 Notre Dame L Rev 1217, 1227. 
52 See, for instance, H Lauteparcht, Private Sources and Analogies of International 
Law (Longmans 1927) 69-70. 
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one’s personal experience. This is certainly of great use to an interna-
tional law that aspires to be inclusive and truly universal in a multi-polar 
world.  
That said, the aspect of the CIL project that strikes me the most is its 
being a multi-layered effort. It does not stop at reinvigorating traditional 
comparative law within the field of public international law. It breaks 
new ground by going beyond this traditional approach. The next section 
discusses the viability of this further dimension of the CIL project.  
 
 
4. Comparative International Law as a sociological and political tool 
 
In a passage cited in the introductory chapter of Comparative Inter-
national Law, Xue Hanqin, the Chinese judge at the International Court 
of Justice, states ‘Notwithstanding its universal character, international 
law in practice is nonetheless not identically interpreted and applied 
among states’.53 From a traditional perspective, this statement is not sur-
prising. It reiterates something of a truism. Difference of opinions and 
interpretations of international law do exist. They are the salt of interna-
tional law as of any legal system. Such differences do not, in and of them-
selves undermine the unity and universality of international law as a legal 
system. They contribute to its development, adaption, and fine-tuning in 
changing circumstances. That said, those differences may shift from the 
physiology to the pathology. They might become a matter of concern if 
they remain unsolved due to a lack of viable mechanisms and institutions. 
A legal order that is not in order because of an irremediable uncertainty 
about the content of its norms and precepts can hardly fulfil its chief 
function of providing guidance and restraining conduct. As such, it is 
doomed to irrelevance.  
Interesting, however, is that under the CIL approach, the existence 
of different perspectives and interpretations is not perceived as a norma-
tive issue that ought to be remedied through appropriate rules, mecha-
nisms, and institutions. Roberts acknowledges that some of the interpre-
tations proffered could indeed be ‘strategic’ and thus not made in good 
faith. As such, they could be closer to personal or professional interests 
than truth. For Roberts, however, the latter attitude is not necessarily the 
 
53 Comparative international law (n 2) 4. 
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rule. It is plausible that differences of interpretation may result from gen-
uine and good faith interpretations, which are contingent on nothing but 
one’s unavoidable subjectivity.  
The diversity of opinions is then a fact and a sociological reality to be 
reflected upon, which commands a change – not of rules – but of atti-
tudes among international lawyers. Under a CIL approach, differences 
among international lawyers could be identified, understood, explained, 
and, ultimately, defused. In this regard, it is useful to look directly at how 
Roberts (and the other scholars supporting the CIL project) describe 
CIL:  
 
‘Comparative international law entails identifying, analysing, and ex-
plaining similarities and differences in how actors in different legal sys-
tems understand, interpret, apply, and approach international law.’54 
 
This definition shows the sui generis nature of the CIL approach. CIL 
does not exist only in the mere application of the idea of comparative law 
to the field of public international law, as illustrated in the previous sec-
tion. More than that, the CIL approach seems to be calling for a journey 
down a somewhat different trajectory from classical comparative law. 
First, CIL seeks to understand differences of interpretation and ap-
proaches within the same legal system, that is, international law, and not 
only in different legal systems as in classical comparative law. Moreover, 
as I understand it, that which is to be compared under the above defini-
tion is not only law – however broadly defined that may be. Instead, in 
addition to the claims made by States (and by their lawyers), it is interna-
tional lawyers’ thinking about and interpreting international law’s rules 
and principles. That notion includes the opinion of private individuals 
because the majority of international lawyers are not governmental offi-
cials. Finally, the purpose of the comparative exercise is to understand 
and explain why international lawyers think of and apply international 
law in the way they do rather than determining what law should be ap-
plied in a given context.55 These traits of the CIL project reveal that it 
essentially serves a cognitive purpose rather than a normative one. As 
such, the CIL approach seems to be amounting to an exercise more akin 
 
54 ibid 6. 
55 See in this regard P Glenn, ‘Comparative Legal Families and Comparative Legal 
Traditions’ in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 422.  
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to sociological analysis rather than to legal analysis. The fundamental 
question it asks is why a given claim is made, as opposed to whether it is 
valid or not. It does not distinguish whether this claim is made by a public 
official or by a private individual. This line of inquiry enables interna-
tional lawyers to be more cautious and reflective, and thus in a position 
to genuinely understand each other, so that ‘new alliances may be forced 
and divisions overcome’.56  This concern unveils the political telos of 
Roberts’ project, which is to ensure a stronger and more fruitful dialogue 
among international lawyers to enhance cooperation and reduce tension 
– if not disputes – among inevitably different communities of interna-
tional lawyers and, as a consequence, among States.  
Assuming that one has correctly grasped the gist of this dimension of 
the CIL project, questions arise. First, one wonders whether the socio-
logical and political exigencies so perceptively articulated by Roberts can 
be effectively tackled by a legal methodology such as CIL. What Roberts 
has identified are not legal problems per se (although they do have legal 
consequences), but they may be regarded as flaws in the professionalism 
and education of contemporary international lawyers. It is the latter 
group that in Roberts’ account appears unequipped for shepherding the 
international law of the 21st century. Therefore, it may be suggested that, 
rather than identifying an appropriate legal tool, the effort should be 
made to identify the hard and soft skills (such as learning more than one’s 
own language57) that international lawyers need to master in a growing, 
complicated multi-polar world.58 The next questions concern the rela-
tionship between CIL and the norms and principles of international law. 
  
 
5.  The relationship between Comparative International Law and the nor-
mativity of International Law 
 
 
56 Roberts, Is International Law International? (n 1) 280. 
57 On the need of English as the lingua franca of international law but also and on the 
perils of monolinguism see C Tomuschat, ‘The (Hegemonic?) Role of the English Lan-
guage’ (2017) 86 Nordic J Intl L 196-227 and M Bohlander, ‘Language, Culture, Legal 
Traditions, and International Criminal Justice’ (2014) 3 J Intl Criminal Justice 1-23.   
58 A Peters, ‘Realizing Utopia as a Scholarly Endevour’ (2013) 25 Eur J Intl L 533, 
540. 
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From a substantive perspective, the question arises as to how the as-
pirations and values that CIL is meant to serve relate to those already 
codified within primary international law rules. From a procedural per-
spective, it can be asked whether CIL may contribute in some way to the 
normativity of international law and hence to its much-needed effective-
ness. The relationship between the CIL approach and what may be re-
ferred to as the normativity of international law is presented by Roberts 
as one of neutrality: the CIL approach does not concern the question of 
adherence to and compliance with international law. However, from a 
lawyer’s perspective, this approach is somewhat puzzling. For a lawyer, 
unlike in the case of a diplomat, politician, theoretician, or philosopher 
of law, it is of the essence to make a synthesis to evaluate one’s argument 
from a normative perspective. This is because the primary question that 
he/she must ultimately answer is whether a given conduct is permissible 
or not. 
CIL provides no criteria, for instance, to distinguish between claims 
made by States, and international lawyers acting in an official capacity or 
in a private capacity as scholars. Moreover, not all the opinions can be 
validly vented by actors, regardless of the reasons on the basis of which 
they have been formulated. As noted by Orfeas Chasapis-Tassinis, it is 
essential for a lawyer ‘to have a clear normative vision of international law 
as law that is supposed to transcend, and not yield to, the differences that 
we look at as a matter of legal discourse’.59 Moreover, the information 
that could be collected through a comparative approach is not neutral. It 
is a set of reasons that may prompt one to agree (or disagree) with a given 
claim, thereby conferring on it legitimacy without, however, relying on 
normative criteria, but rather on a variety of policy considerations. What 
is then necessary is some norm of coordination that explains how the 
wealth of information collected through comparison may impact on ex-
isting norms and rules of international law, and whether, for instance, it 
may justify a departure from them or not. 
 If international law is not simply what international lawyers do, but 
also what States do, it is all the more necessary to connect the dots of 
what I may characterise as the ‘subjective’ dimension of international law 
 
59 O Chasapis-Tassinis, ‘The Self-seeing Soul and Comparative International Law: 
Reading Anthea Roberts' Is International Law International?’ (2018) 7 Cambridge Intl L 
J 185. 
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represented by the interpretations of its content by international lawyers, 
and the ‘objective’ dimension of international law. The latter is given by 
the factual reality that there are rules and principles agreed upon by 
States and consolidated in international treaties or norms of customary 
law. The CIL approach focuses on the subjective dimension of interna-
tional law. However, when it ventures beyond the normative data, that 
is, norms or administrative and judicial decisions enacted by entities ex-
ercising public functions, and enters the realm of lawyers’ opinions and 
thinking, it tilts the balance excessively in favour of the subjective dimen-
sion of international law.  
Hence, my concern, which can only be flagged for reasons of space, 
is that the CIL approach could attribute more importance to the practice 
of lawyers rather than to the practice of States as if interpretations pro-
vided by States on the content of international law were on par with those 
of international lawyers. The more subjective a legal discipline becomes, 
the more it loses its capacity to bind all its subjects equally and thus, ul-
timately, its normativity. 
For all its imperfections and limitations, to me international law is 
not, at the time of writing, an eminently subjective discipline dominated 
by the opinions of its scholars. There was probably a period of its history 
in which it was so, as Martti Koskenniemi has discussed. 60 Neither is it a 
language that lawyers can use to motivate any claim whatsoever. When 
we look at it from a historical perspective, it becomes clear that interna-
tional law has grown since the aftermath of World War II into quite a 
dense corpus of primary and secondary norms that are reasonably deter-
minate and binding. In particular, within its objective dimension, inter-
national law has come to contain several ‘communitarian values’ in the 
sense of core ideas on which most States (from different corners of the 
planet) have, by and large, agreed, and, more often than not, sought to 
adhere to, and ensure compliance with. A detailed analysis of what these 
values are and why it is possible to define them as such, and what is in-
tended with the adjective ‘communitarian’, of course, requires further 
 
60 See M Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations (CUP 2002) especially 11-97. 
Writing in 1965, Clive Parry remarked that the ‘books and opinions of the nineteenth 
century seem often to resemble catalogues of the praises of famous men. ‘Hear also what 
Hall sayeth. Hear the comfortable words of Oppenheim’ is an incantation which persists 
even into this century’. C Parry, The Sources and Evidences of International Law 
(Manchester UP 1965) 103. 
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discussion that must be left for another paper. However, for the purposes 
of this paper, it may be sufficient to note that no less an authority than 
James Crawford has spoken of the existence of ‘communitarian values’ 
in a piece recently published in the Modern Law Review.61 At the con-
clusion of an analysis of what international law has become through a 
process of codification (which, interestingly, flourished when the inter-
national community was also multi-polar) since the end of World War II, 
Crawford comes to the following conclusion:  
 
‘Adjustments may be necessary to respond to perceived inequalities or 
injustices […] but we should also be wary of the increasing rhetoric of 
skepticism towards international law. Over time, this may precipitate a 
larger-scale retreat into nativism and unilateralism. We should be ready 
to defend the communitarian values of international law against this 
possibility.’62  
 
I agree with this conclusion. Hence, the challenge for international 
lawyers who want to build a viable and binding international law for the 
21st century is dual in my view. Not only should they learn about the 
subjective dimension of international law, but they should also 
coordinate it, through a coherent methodology, with its objective 
dimension, the existence and detail of which has increased significantly 




A CIL approach is certainly to be welcomed if it means insisting on 
the need for acquiring more knowledge and understanding of different 
perspectives before passing judgment. A comparative law methodology 
is already used in certain domains of public international law. Refreshing 
such a use by making it more comprehensive and ultimately fairer is cer-
tainly useful for a contemporary international law. It is also necessary to 
maintain bridges between the international, the regional, and the domes-
tic level. A comparison of how norms are construed and thought of at the 
international (or regional) level, and are received and applied locally, is 
 
61 J Crawford, ‘The Current Political Discourse Concerning International Law’ 
(2018) 81 Modern L Rev 1.  
62 ibid 22.  
38 QIL 54 (2018) 21-38          ZOOM IN 
 
pressing to effectively assess the content, reach, and validity of a norm of 
international law. This scrutiny is part of the ‘homework’ of each profes-
sional international lawyer. Insofar as CIL is a reminder of that duty, it 
deserves much appreciation.  
The analysis of CIL as a sociological and political tool must be more 
nuanced. The CIL approach does not stop at the comparison of what 
States do internationally or domestically. It looks beyond what the law is, 
no matter how broadly it is interpreted, to discuss opinions and interpre-
tations. Roberts is right that this knowledge would encourage interna-
tional lawyers to be more reflective about their own limits. How to use 
this knowledge from a legal perspective, however, is not clear. The risk is 
misusing this knowledge to justify claims that run contrary to widely-ac-
cepted communitarian values, which would reduce further the norma-
tivity of a legal system already under strain.  
 
  
